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TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: THE VALUE
OF DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE FOR CIVIL
COMMUNICATION
DON WAISANEN

This article explores questions about "civility" in the 2012 election. Through
an analysis ofmedia discussions raising the term, four themes are constructed
focusing on the limitations of civility discourse. While seeking to preserve the
best that civil orientations afford, I argue that adding a deliberative approach
to such discourse addresses moments when civil appeals appear to be most
limited. This essay finds that working between civil and deliberative con
structs provides an instructive perspective for understanding the workings of
and possibilities for public discourse during situations when civility rhetoric is
typically raised. Relative to civil communication-and associated concepts
such as dialogue and advocacy-specific norms, benefits, examples, and im
plications of a deliberative rhetorical vision are charted for problem-solving,
public policy contexts.

ivility is an important concept for public discourse. Few would
want less rather than more civility in their interactions with others,
and to some extent, the very viability of public discourse could be
said to depend upon how such interactions take place. As Sigmund Freud
once stated, the idea that "civilization began the first time an angry person
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cast a word instead of a rock" surely resonates with anyone who has faced
the pressures of physical or verbal assault. 1 Robert Ivie similarly holds that
"when politics reduces to hostility and contestation degenerates into war
fare against an evil or otherwise dehumanized and despised internal and/or
external enemy, democracy is lost. "2 In one of the most methodical defenses
of the topic to date, Stephen Carter defined civility as "the sum of the many
sacrifices we are called to make for the sake of living together,"3 which
connects with the interests of rhetorical scholars exploring how certain
forms of discourse can either advance or undermine democratic engage
ment under conditions of disagreement and difference.
In this spirit, there is much worth preserving about civility. If politics is
about how people come together to address the challenges of communities
and societies, the chief value of civil communication appears to lie in its
common associations with respect. In public contexts, where there will
always be deep1 differences about how to engage political questions, individ
uals have to communicate some degree of respect for others whose beliefs,
values, or attitudes do not match their own to establish some grounds for
problem-solving collaboration. With respect comes a recognition that there
are others whose lives, needs, and well-being are implicated with one's own,
and that in public settings, diverse messages and standards deserve spaces
for expression. Without such respect, communicators run the risk of as
suming their messages about politics can speak for everyone's demands, a
task they surely cannot. Between respect and civic demands, I contend, we
thus find civility: not simply respect for respect's sake, but expressions that
others are valued amid disagreements over pressing social issues.
While recognizing civility's importance to public affairs, however, any
detailed investigation of the topic soon runs into a rather sordid back
ground. Over 40 years ago, Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith outlined
how "a rhetorical theory suitable to our age must take into account the
charge that civility and decorum serve as masks for the preservation of
injustice, that they condemn the dispossessed to non-being" and can "be
come the instrumentalities of power for those who 'have."'4 In other words,
any serious analysis of civility must also theorize how it can be used as a
weapon, particularly when equated with universalizing, uniform standards
of interaction that everyone is expected to follow under all circumstances,
ignoring unequal relations of power, forms of appeal, and the differing
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communication styles made available to and expressed by those of varying
backgrounds, cultures, and belief systems.
Surveying Mississippi slave owners' use of civility to resist challenge, for
example, Raymie McKerrow argued that civility has historically served to
perpetuate systems of oppression. In particular, mannered expressions
between slave owners and slaves merely reinforced forms of social engage
ment sanctioned and defined by those in power, doing little to change deep
inequalities or the acceptance of "cultural other[s]." McKerrow concludes
that pleas to "just get along" are hence insufficient for the kinds of complex
social issues with which modem societies are confronted. 5 Exploring civility
during the Renaissance, Charles Taylor similarly demonstrated how no
tions of" civilization" were used by those in power to claim it was something
they had and others did not. Differences between elites and "savages" were
generated through tame/wild and culture/nature binaries, with civility and
ethnocentricity working side by side. 6 Analyses of civility's role in gender
oppression, especially in depictions of women "as less civilized than men,"7
in racial subjugation,8 and in muting protestor's demands by framing them
as "out of control" have been further covered by other scholars. 9
Given these problems, a critical tension has developed in rhetorical
scholarship over how rhetors should approach one another in the public
arena. Nina Lozano-Reich and Dana Cloud contend that as much as civility
may be called for, an "uncivil tongue" is necessary to liberate individuals
and groups who are not on an equal playing field of discussion. 10 Respond
ing to Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin's and Jennifer Bone, Cindy Griffin, and
Linda Scholz's proposals for "invitational rhetoric" -a paradigm con
structed from feminist literatures arguing for nonconfrontational dialogue
rather than more direct efforts at persuasion11 -Lozano-Reich and Cloud
argue that civil discussion "presupposes conditions of economic, political,
and social equality among interlocutors" that are rare in everyday prac
tice.12 They find the powerful have little incentive for inviting the less
powerful to such discussions, so justice and equality tend to be advanced
more by efforts at overt persuasion and explicit actions such as protests. 13
Both sides appear to agree about the types of actions that constitute invita
tional, civil discourse (respectful words and gestures, for example) and
underscore that civility is only one among many options in public dis
course. But they each place different value upon the extent to which civil
approaches can and should meet practical political demands. In particular,
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a core concern is whether respectful dialogue or boisterous advocacy in
pursuit of material social change should be the "desired ends of rhetorical
engagement." 14
Working between these lines, rhetorical scholars have examined other
times when exclusive concerns for civility have left political discourse
impoverished. Christie Hurrell argues that "civil dialogue alone cannot
ensure effective communication between governments and citizens." 15
Christopher Darr finds "civil rationality" a U.S. Senate norm that "reveals a
particular notion of argumentation that is impersonal and void of intense
emotion," marginalizing "the role of character, ethics, and emotion, which
can be vital in such debates," 16 and that might make for broader, more
accessible forms of public communication. Continuing scholarship has
engaged the question of whether polite engagement or rowdier forms of
communication are generally best for democracy, 17 with Thomas Benson
concluding that, "civility and incivility are communicative, rhetorical prac
tices. As such, they are always situational and contestable." 18
To move these discussions forward, I examine recent media examples of
civility rhetoric to tease out the types of meanings and connections public
figures have drawn in their own use of the concept. This analysis will
highlight the complexities ofcivil communication to demonstrate the worth
a deliberative approach could offer such constructions. I will argue that a
deliberative approach to public affairs offers the possibility of improving
concerns for civil discourse itself. While seeking to preserve the best that
civil orientations afford, working between civil and deliberative constructs
generally provides an instructive perspective for understanding the work
ings of and possibilities for public discourse during moments when civility
rhetoric is typically raised. Relative to civil communication-and associated
concepts such as dialogue and advocacy-specific norms, benefits, exam
ples, and implications of a deliberative rhetorical vision are charted for
problem-solving, public policy contexts.
MEDIA DISCOURSE IN THE

2012

ELECTION

In addition to exploring many journalistic reports, videos, and web mes
sages from the 2012 election cycle, the author gathered systematic media
data to capture a glimpse of the types of meanings in context(s) when
commentators and advocates used the term "civility." 19 Following Sarah
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Sobieraj and Jeffrey Berry, who find that in political communication studies
of civility/incivility, "the effects research exists alongside minimal data on
the content of real political discourse,"20 a close reading of texts was con
ducted. Per Edward Schiappa's insights, moreover, the analysis focused less
upon "the" definition of"civility" than the meanings and purposes rhetors
attached to the term.21 A Lexis-Nexis search of all Broadcast Transcripts
with the term "civility" from July 1 to December 31, 2012, was used to
identify how the term was discussed in the buildup to and aftermath of the
election.
To create a manageable scope (from 657 documents), the search focused
on major U.S. news show transcripts like CNN and Fox News, which
produced 1,551 pages with over 203 instances of the word "civility" ( 133
transcripts total). "Civility" was mostly employed by Fox News (48 tran
scripts); CNN came in second (29), and MSNBC third (19), with other
networks like CBS and ABC following behind. Using Kenneth Burke's
advice to trace words across a range of works and to look for "what goes with
what" and "what is vs. what,"22 four aspects of "civility" emerged from the
media transcripts, each of which assigns progressively less value to the
concept.
CONFUSING TERMS

First, media discourse during the election highlighted much variance in the
language around and about civility. As might be imagined, many pundits
and interlocutors used terms such as "tone," "deference," "cordiality," "con
duct," "respect," and "manners" in the context of "civility."23 But it was also
positioned with self-deprecating humor, "compassion," and being friendly
and "emotional."24 There was a reference to "humility," and even "tough
ness with a smile" in the transcripts.25 The term was sometimes connected
to more extreme, potential threats of violence, particularly in the context of
2012 U.S. shootings, violence against cops, and as the opposite of, using a
militant verbal antonym, "sniping."26
The author conducted an additional Lexis-Nexis search of major U.S.
newspapers during the election, and used the software program Concor
dance to highlight statistical counts of each of the four words to both the left
and right of the term "civility" across the papers (379 uses of the word were
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found). This separate analysis further confirmed a notable diversity of
concepts used in conjunction with the word.27 The significance of confu
sion over what civility may mean partly lies in the term's instability in
practice; that is, in how rhetors bypassed the different associations and
purposes to which the term was put, potentially leaving citizens with little
clarity about the term's usefulness for public engagement. But a confusing
irony also emerged in how media commentators raised civility in discus
sions of what better public engagement could look like while characterizing
the concept as too limited or incomplete to help with such expectations.
Some rhetors distinguished civility from constructs like "compromise,"
but left the potential relationship between these kinds of terms open-ended.
One show covered what was described as Republican vice-presidential
candidate Paul Ryan's "Midwestern nice" political style and mixed voting
record in Congress. In response to Ryan's demeanor and record, the pro
gram cut to a clip of Congressman Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) stating, "let's
not confuse civility with a willingness to compromise,"28 before quickly
moving on to another show segment. Beyond the question of how terms like
"compromise" might relate to civility, Van Hollen promoted a sense that
civility by itself is too weak to sustain a robust public discourse. That
audiences could become "confuse[d]" by the invocation of "civility" when
questions of compromise were at issue suggests that civil communication
alone was seen as somehow too limited for this situation.
On a brighter note, commentators like Mickey Edwards pleaded that "we
have got to create incentives for civility, incentives for compromise, incen
tives to listen to each other and to sit down together."29 Both civility and
compromise are clearly valued in such statements, but further ways in
which these concepts could relate also begged further insight. For instance,
does civil communication require that one engage in compromises or, at a
minimum, simply be ready to compromise at any point during discussions?
And could civility ever require that one keep compromises to a minimum,
say, to move an important, ethical cause forward? Media interlocutors
raised a number of terms like compromise with civility, but in a relatively
unexamined fashion that left viewers with some potentially confusing rhe
torical tensions.
Similarly, rhetors used civility with concepts like "partisanship" across
the transcripts. 30 One commentator said that "one of the things that polls
have showed is that people are really sick of partisanship and incivility in
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Washington." 31 In a reverse construction, a CNN chief White House corre
spondent urged that politics needs more civility and "bipartisanship." 32
Both examples situate civility with terms of political moderation, apparently
excluding an option that one could be both civil and highly partisan in
public discourse. Overall, civility is constructed as needing another concept
to fulfill its political potential and as possibly too weak to be sustained in the
midst of vehement advocacy.
Geoffrey Nunberg may have best captured the potentially confusing
ways in which civility rhetoric can be used in remarking that "it's better to
look at the word that we use in our daily lives to react to incivility and that
reflects our genuine attitudes without being contaminated by all the ponti
fication that a word like civility can evoke." 33 Although Nunberg misses
civility's virtues, such a charge evidences some desire to moor the concept
with firmer grounding than public discourse appears to have, at times, made
available.
Finally, the relationship between civility and reason emerged as another
confusing point across the transcripts. Whether civility is exclusively a
matter of tone or shares some type of important connection with reason
invited further inquiry. These two concepts were further focused by the next
issue.
SUBSTANTIVE DIVISIONS

Commentators and advocates frequently conceived of civility and "reason/
substance" as separate issues across the transcripts. Covering the vice
presidential debate, Jelani Cobb on MSNBC noted that "if you get past the
issue of the civility and we get past the snickering and those kinds of things,
Joe Biden was far and away more substantive." 34 Cobb made civility and
substantive points separate issues, with civility as a dissociated appearance
divided from real reasons or reasoning.35 President Obama even seemed to
loosely divide the two concepts: "I think that over time, people respond to
civility and rational argument." 36 In such cases, civility is seen as vital to the
political process, but is either subordinated or separated from substantive
argumentation-reducing civility to merely gestural or behavioral niceties.
Like the confusing terms with which civility rhetoric can be invoked,
divisions from substance highlight how commentators consider civility
important but also lacking without other concepts.
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In the transcripts, a division between civility and reason/substance even
appeared to prevent debate. In a story easily missed during the election,
Pastor Rick Warren of Saddleback Church in Southern California-who
held a civility forum between John McCain and Barack Obama in 2008decided to not provide the same opportunity between Obama and Romney
in 2012, "citing nasty campaign rhetoric. Warren says he's never seen more
irresponsible personal attacks and mean-spirited slander." 37 While Warren
clarified that he did not think it would be fitting to be "civil temporarily"38 in
such an environment, more remarkably, a focus on civility obscured a need
to talk, even about civility in the election itself. Where civility is seen as too
weak to carry a robust public discourse in other examples, Warren enacts an
opposite consideration: incivility is constructed as too strong or excessive
for viable communication, creating a rhetorical overflow that surpasses the
possibility for substance and reasoning. Rhetors hence leveraged civil or
uncivil terms as weak or dangerous to divide the concept from substantive
issues.
The results demonstrated that the word "civility" emerged the most
across the Fox News transcripts and largely from pundit Sean Hannity. Since
the Obama administration has frequently used the term in support of its
policies, 39 this finding may simply be a result of the network's typical
commitment to oppose the president's rhetoric at every turn. In a media
environment committed to such high percentages of opinion program
ming,40 however, a rhetoric that persistently implies commentators are
"substantive" could also function to create an impression that the network is
conducting credible journalism.
When a Democratic strategist raised the point that a much maligned
figure in the national news had handled the controversy "with dignity and
grace," Hannity quickly opined, "but the foundation of what she said was
false,"41 raising a tension between tonal performance and substantive rhet
oric. Hannity's use of the term "foundation" is instructive, in this regard,
situating substance/reason as not only separate from considerations of
civility, but as vertically deeper and hence more important than the implied
shallower, surface-level horizon of civil communication. In a similar show
segment, Hannity urged former Alaskan governor Sarah Palin to break
down Joe Biden's vice-presidential debate performance. Palin stated
Biden's "indting-type rhetoric" would not appeal to "those who are rational
American voters just wanting to deal with facts and [the] true state of the
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union."42 Implicitly, Palin draws a similar distinction between Biden's
uncivil, "inciting" style and substantive facts/policies to argue that he has
failed on both counts, making civility only a matter of style or tone.
FAKE CIVILITY

Related to the last point, beyond constructing civility as merely stylistic, the
transcripts evidenced the use of civility as "fake." Rhetors constructed the
concept as either an unreal tactic or unreflective, emotional impulse that
others use to cover for a lack of "real" understanding. Reacting to pundit
Sam Donaldson's reflections on how Barack Obama won the election,
conservative Michelle Malkin stated: "There he goes. The new tone and
civility, I think he has been living in the D.C. bubble way too long and
probably hitting the sauce too much." 43 Malkin implies that Donaldson's
"tone and civility" are a part of an unreal "D .C. bubble," where mainstream,
liberal journalists are unreflectively civil but misguided. The trope of "hit
ting the sauce" (a colloquial reference to drinking too much alcohol) rein
forces a sense that calls to civility are being made in an unthinking haze that
masks important political realities. Relative to the confusing terms and
substantive divisions identified in this analysis, where many rhetors still
tended to see civility as important, here civility becomes merely a worthless,
mystifying tactic.
Malkin further charged the White House with issuing "all of these lofty
edicts about civility and coming together" to place a veil over its machina
tions with big labor.44 Under these terms, Malkin constructs calls for civility
as a false means for procuring political advantages, and as an approach to
avoid due to its potential for chicanery. At the same time, asserting "fake
civility" represents the person making this charge as in control of a "real,"
uniform standard of interaction. Although there is a possibility that media
commentators are simply viewing differing communication styles or forms
of appeal than they are used to or would choose themselves, comments
about fake civility function to cast them as bearers of universally "real" and
hence "right" standards of interaction, reducing varying expressions of
civility to a correct or incorrect, totalizing type of performance.
In essence, such comments strikingly imply that offers of civility are their
very opposite: civility cannot be trusted given its masking function and link
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with a fake/real binary. Covering the first presidential debate, Chris Mat
thews pronounced that "Romney, with all this cordiality and phony civility,
talked to [Obama] like a lesser being and that drove the president crazy." 45
As demonstrated by commentators on both the political left and right, this
type of fake/real rhetoric fostered a speculative focus upon individual can
didates' performances and motives, with MSNBCs Rachel Maddow also
remaining concerned about the "fake civility" and "phony" behaviors be
tween the candidates.46 Pundits did not remark on how they made such
calculations of fakery, however, characterizing civility's worthlessness and
opponents' motives as largely self-evident. Seeing civility in terms of such
fakery further illustrates the confusing terms with which rhetors used the
concept. Where civility sometimes meant genuine gestures of appreciation,
these examples focused upon civility as exclusively inauthentic.
Along these lines, Palin engaged fake civility charges more implicitly in
stating that "when I hear Barack Obama speak about ethics and civility, it's
nauseating to me."47 Constructing civility as fake communication, Hannity
was equally fond oflabeling Obama "President Civi�ity," a satirical moniker
underscoring the extent to which the president's calls for civility were seen
as bogus and never "real."48 Yet the questions might be asked: are all
discussions of ethics and civility by political figures one opposes simply
unreal masks, as such comments appear to presume? At what threshold are
media commentators able to decide that talks ofethics and civility are not
really about ethics and civility?
One standard of "inconsistency" was applied when Hannity argued that
Obama tended to do nothing in the face of "violence"; for example, during
the Occupy Wall Street movement's clashes with police. 49 Hannity implied
that Obama was inconsistent in not making a statement about these matters
and hence did not really care about civility. As a means ofintervening into
and parsing out civility rhetoric's complexities, however, inconsistency
seems unable to help Hannity and others distinguish between moments
when civility should and should not be used-a point further focused by the
next finding.
RHETORICAL WEAPONRY

A final theme emerged in the transcripts, namely, commentators' charges
that "civility" is merely a weapon used to shut down speech or put others in
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losing positions. An election discussion between Tohn Stossel and Bill
O'Reilly about a University of North Carolina campus speech code high
lighted this issue:
Stossel: But when you have all these rules and they have a civility code
which would ban you, then, what it means is they use them to punish people
they don't like. And those are usually people like you.
O'Reilly: Tell me about the Civility Code at the University of North
Carolina
Stossel: All speech must be civil. And, you know, that feels right. Why not
have a nice speech[?} But the Civil Rights Movement and the protests sitting
in a lunch hall and refusing to leave on a lunch counter because they're racist,
it's important not to be civil all the time.
O'Reilly: So, if I go down there and I call somebody a "pinhead," am I
arrested by the campus police[?]
Stossel: You, according to their code, would be kicked out of school.
O'Reilly: Is that right. Wow.50

Rather than describing civility as a mechanism for inviting discourse, op
positely, O'Reilly and Stossel's conversation centers upon civility as a means
of narrowing public speech to exclude disagreements. Stossel's odd example
of the civil rights movement (which leaves aside the movement's strategic
"nonviolence" and "civil disobedience") and O'Reilly's point about calling
someone a "pinhead" also assumes incivility is sometimes useful, a point
begging a better understanding of when and why civility should and should
not be used. More so, Stossel uses a dodging rhetoric in this construction,
asserting that civility codes uncivilly overreach by excluding disagreeable
forms of communication from debate-but Stossel also bypasses the social
problems or substance/reasons intended to be highlighted through such
codes. Different than the confusing terms and substantive divisions, where
commentators typically positioned civility with or against other terms in
efforts to distinguish but retain some of its value, civility needs little saving
when framed as either fakery or a damaging weapon.
Through these episodes, pundits characterized civility as a rhetorical tool
that "they" use against "us," paradoxically to position one's own cause as
superior. A sense of being a victim informs such exchanges, so that Stossel,
O'Reilly, and those they purport to represent can be seen as swimming
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upstream in the culture, regardless of their elite positions. In claiming this
beleaguered status, the rhetoric functions to assert an oppression justifying
the use of uncivil discourse, to associate one's cause with well-regarded,
marginalized communities (in this case, the Civil Rights Movement), and to
invite sympathizing audiences to become more politically active in a battle
where apparently innocuous concepts like civility come loaded with strate
gic manipulation. In a similar conversation with Newt Gingrich, Hannity
rebuked the mainstream press for not covering the incivility of leftists.51
Hannityand Gingrich implied that the very absence of attention to incivility
was an indictment against liberal media coverage about the issue of civility
itself. Many of these claims added up to the charge that others are really
uncivil in the way that they use civility, calling into question the construct's
value for public discourse.
Yet calls for civility equally became a device for discussants to steer
conversations away from actually talking about the particular issue(s) at
hand. In another election period story, the owner of the Chick-fil-A restau
rant chain ignited a national controversy through remarks about gay mar
riage. Discussing the debate, one media interlocutor asked another: "can we
not have some civility about someone having an opinion? And by the way,
it's OK for you to disagree with whoever."52 In such remarks, one person
perceives another as shutting down debate through civil freedoms that are
not offered to him or herself. In making this rhetorical move, however, the
same advocate uses civility as a means of both minimizing another's claims
and diverting the discussion away from how such opinions were formed in
the first place, creating stopping points for further communication.
THE VALUE OF "DELIBERATIVE" DISCOURSE FOR CIVIL
COMMUNICATION

The preceding analysis provides a small window into some unacknowl
edged tensions in the practice of civility rhetoric. Such discourses may
certainly highlight examples of unwarranted rudeness, or of civility as a
useful ideal and working standard. But media advocates often put civility
rhetoric to oppressive work in, for instance, using the concept as a type ofad
hominem attack, where one gains by attacking others' civility rather than
the issues presented. At times, the often confused and unreflective dealings
of media commentaries covering civility issues thus skirt more productive,
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robust understandings of what might be possible for public reasoning and
reasonability.53
In this spirit, while retaining the best that civility offers, there are distinct
advantages to adding a "deliberative" approach to concerns for civil com
munication. By making manifest how our understandings of the types of
issues often raised by civility can be addressed through general and specific
deliberative approaches, this section works toward a fuller framework for
civil public engagement. Ultimately, moving between civil and deliberative
approaches offers stronger conceptions for what more democratic forms of
communication could look like.
DELIBERATIVE: A GENERAL APPROACH

To work between civil and deliberative communication, this section con
structs a general definition of"deliberative" discourse. To do so, I must first
turn to what others have meant by the concept. The idea that dialogue and
civility share some kind of relationship has been articuiated by others.
Carter's remark that "anything that interferes with dialogue is bad for
civility" draws a relationship between these two notions. 54 Yet, as noted
from the previous analysis and prior research, sometimes civility rhetoric
can be a way of interfering with dialogue. Others have provided closer
bridges between civility and dialogue, with Ronald Arnett explicitly con
structing "dialogic civility" as "an interpersonal metaphor grounded in the
public domain and in a pragmatic commitment to keeping the conversation
going in a time of narrative confusior. and virtue fragmentation." 55 Nate the
feature of "keeping the conversation going," a sentiment echoed in W.
Barnett Pearce and Kim Pearce's normative construction of"dialogic virtu
osity," a type of communication "that enable[s] people to speak so that
others can and will listen, and to listen so that others can and will speak." 56
In theory and practice, finer distinctions have been drawn between
concepts like "dialogue" and "deliberation."57 The National Coalition for
Dialogue and Deliberation underscores how both constructs engage needs
for social or material change, but dialogue typically involves a small-group
process of simply sharing perspectives or experiences about issues that are
difficult to discuss (such as racial inequity or gay marriage), with a goal of
learning and understanding rather than argument or consensus. 58 On the
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other hand, deliberation typically has more of a public, instrumental focus,
with participants sharing and exploring options to make decisions over
pressing issues. Both dialogue and deliberation attend to constructing use
ful norms for engagement, needs for inclusion and equality, expanding
grounds for discussion, and "building civic capacity," however.59
There is a burgeoning interdisciplinary literature on deliberative democ
racy, although "deliberative" is still not a term much used in U.S. public
culture. Scholars typically associate deliberation with problem-solving, es
pecially where a variety of perspectives and positions exist on a public policy
issue. Discussions of deliberative democracy raise the ongoing project(s) of
Tilrgen Habermas and his scholarly following to construct and advance
open, reasoned communication norms and forms of argument fitting for a
democratic politics, while critiquing the forces working "to depoliticize
public communication" in and across societies.60
Some examples from this line of inquiry include the ways in which
personal or technical arguments can be used to forgo or extend public
communication practices, the constraints that the form or content of poiit
ical language place upon deliberative ideals, the styles or setups of particular
forums, or analyses of how some historical events have contributed to the
loss of deliberative practices.61 Overall, the quest to advance better norms
for deliberation is an evolving project, with varying research lines advocat
ing for more cosmopolitan practices or forms of "transcendent eloquence"
that are contextually sensitive.62 Overall, deliberative democracy scholars
focus on "what putting [deliberation] into practice would mean, or how it is
possible under the social conditions of pluralistic and complex societies."63
Rhetorical theorists have aligned themselves with this project, with a goal of
"equip[ping] democratic citizens to become better rhetoricians" to promote
more intersubjective and liberatory conditions for communication. 64
In general, public deliberation has been defined as "debate and discus
sion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new
information, and claims made by fellow participants."65 It is "an uncon
strained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and al
ways potentially leads to a transformation of preferences."66 As such,
scholars have emphasized both a continual openness to others and a will
ingness to revise one's own positions as critical to deliberative approaches.
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Robert Asen adds the idea that "deliberation entails a meta-level of
critical reflection that promotes perspective-taking, which is a form of
recognizing difference."67 The taking in of others' perspectives and ability
to work with difference play key roles in deliberation. In what may be the
most important consideration, however, engaging in deliberative discourse
means remaining keenly attuned to how "an advocate's discourse implicitly
or explicitly widens or narrows discursive space for others."68 In other
words, like Habermas's concern for highlighting norms that advance or
detract from reason and reasonability in society, deliberative discourse
manifests a continual concern for how and when space is opened and closed
for others in acts of communication. Deliberative communication consti
tutes the kind of "rhetorical culture" Thomas Farrell characterized as "an
institutional formation in which [the] motives of competing parties are
intelligible, audiences available, expressions reciprocal, norms translatable,
and silences noticeable," 69 underscoring additional concerns for making
discussions equal, accessible, and attentive to power relations.
Out of this background (and for reasons of parsimony), I will define
being "deliberative" generally as making broadly informed judgments with
an unending openness to others' communication when evaluating different
perspectives and positions oriented toward a public policy problem. Beyond
being civil, engaging in deliberative discourse recognizes how communica
tion acts to open and close space for further communication. For example,
an individual could be very passionate about a cause like gun control, but
still open to others' communication. Given the information that this indi
vidual has taken in to this point in life, he or she may make a policy
argument such as "the federal government should create a law banning
assault weapons." In coming to this conclusion, this person narrows com
municative space to make a judgment; she or he is no longer searching for
answers and is at a decision point. But if this judgment is made with the idea
that others' communication could still impact her or his belief(s) about the
policy problem, we could say that this individual is engaging in "delibera
tive" discourse. Given what is thought to be an overwhelming accumulation
of evidence in support of this policy conclusion, passionate, even angry
arguments or ways of arguing could still be warranted, so long as this person
maintains some space for others' points of view. This rhetorical theory
accounts both for the processes and products ofcommunication, construct
ing room for vigorous, expansive deliberation and decided advocacy-
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never losing sight of both but always leaving some space open for further
communication to potentially alter one's positions.
Under these terms, I would suggest that one's civil behavior should be
seen as an important part of this deliberative approach, or how a person is
opening or closing space in and across communicative acts. Across many
situations, civil communication is likely to be the best default position to
open space for others and communicate one's orientation for broadly
informed judgments. Yet a deliberative approach to public discourse need
not be reduced to civil communication. From the preceding example, if we
were to judge the angry gun control advocates' way of arguing in light of
typical understandings of civility, we might be tempted to reduce this
individual's communication to their tone or manner. But from a delibera
tive standpoint, the possibility that the anger is coming from a broadly
informed judgment in accord with what that person argues they know
about the issue should be noted. Space could still be left open for other,
different points of view to quell that person's current, justified anger.
In this sense, being deliberative rather than simply civil would have us
seriously consider all our stopping points in political matters-even the ways
our characterizations of others' civility could be stopping points for com
munication-with both practical and ethical implications. As the rhetorical
tradition has long heralded, human beings have to make practical judg
ments every day with less than complete information; for example, should a
person choose to vote yes or no on a particular state proposition? The
making of broadly informed judgments takes seriously the need for tenta
tive conclusions in contingent political affairs, but engaging in deliberative
discourse means never completely foreclosing the possibility for more communication to amend one's viewpoints. For scope, this general definition of
"deliberative" discourse is being restricted to public policy contexts involv
ing problem-solving. It could perhaps inform other domains of human
experience, such as religious or interpersonal spheres;70 but this analysis
leaves aside such applications to focus exclusively upon how deliberative
communication could apply in political, problem-solving debates.
To be clear, where dialogue and deliberation are often associated with an
exchange between individuals, my definition of "deliberative" intentionally
focuses more on the attitudes and approaches of an individual; that is, as an
orientation for making individual judgments. This definition carries an
Aristotelian bent, highlighting a need for civil orators before interactive
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processes. Aristotle not only cast rhetoric as a kind of individual "ability, in
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion," but focused
on the "deliberative speaker" who could best serve the body politic by
aiming for an expansive knowledge of public issues (which relates to the
"broadly informed" part of "deliberative") and other ethical norms like
"manyfriendships and goodfriendships" (which places some value upon and
opens space for others with competing perspectives and positions on a
problem). 71 Similar to Aristotle's approach, "deliberative" describes an
orientation largely preceding "deliberation" as an exchange between people.
For any exchange to take place, individuals have to be even marginally
deliberative with one another. An interaction in which two individuals are
completely closed to one another from the outset is no exchange at all.
A focus on "deliberative" discourse has the additional benefit of placing
some accountability for deliberation in an individual's discursive acts,
rather than primarily positioning the loci of deliberative action outside such
enactments of citizenship, say, in a forum or in social structures.72 This is
not to downplay that certain rules or procedures for deliberation-like
asking participants to sit in a circle, take turns speaking, or paraphrase one
another's arguments-could not foster deliberative orientations among
individuals who initially appeared quite closed to one another. But such
rules or procedures still ultimately target each individual's assent to being
more deliberative with others than might be fostered under other condi
tions. As an ethical matter, engaging in deliberative discourse hence recog
nizes that no human is a god and that all political judgments are partial and
beckon accountability, points explored further in the next section.
DELIBERATIVE: SOME SPECIFIC QUALITIES

To bolster the aforementioned, general definition of "deliberative," some
specific planks provide further explanation and justification for a delibera
tive orientation in public affairs: respecting human limitations, recognizing
how one both exerts and is subject to power in acts of speaking and listening,
and becoming comfortable with multiple identities in politics. As leveraged
in the types of media discourses analyzed, constructions of civility have at
times been too singular and minimalist to take these types of considerations
into account. Each of these qualities underscores the process by which
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broadly informed judgm ents that remain continually open to others' com
munication might be made when evaluating public policy problems. They
are not intended to be definitive, but rather offer additional senses for how
stronger conceptions of political communication could be generated by
adding a "deliberative" approach to "civil" rhetoric.
Following from the preceding general definition, one specific quality of
"deliberative" communication involves a respectfor human limitations- or
taking seriously the interpretive, linguistic, psychological, and critical rea
soning problems to which human beings are prone. Deliberative individu
als might maintain a sense for how the filtering aspects of human language
inspire and effect action, how the problems of fallacies can hinder discus
sions, and more broadly, how selective one's interpretations can become,
opening or closing discursive space for others' perspectives at any particular
time.73 In the media transcripts, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) modeled one
such deliberative moment in apologizing for some rude comments he made
about fellow Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). Coburn reflected that "I always
will, a little bit every now and then, make some mistakes in terms of my
words,"74 acknowledging some of his rhetorical limitations.
Without getting into the thicket of research pertaining to these matters,
for now it is simply worth pointing out how much knowledge from social
psychology and similar fields deals with these types of issues. Calls for civil
communication warrant a broader rhetorical theory considering the prob
lems of human processing highlighted by the confirmation bias-the ten
dency of humans to search for information that confirms their prior
beliefs-and social judgment and similar theories. 75 While discussing im
portant topics like civility, media discussions tend to be completely walled
off from knowledge about the limitations humans face when thinking and
communicating. A definition of"deliberative" discourse focusing on open
ing and closing space for others assumes some capacity to make judgments
without, for instance, overstating how one has come to such conclusions
with a recognition that some space for others had to be opened to make a
political decision in the first place.
Along these lines, another specific quality involves recognizing how one
both exerts and is subject to power in acts of speaking and listening
essentially placing attention upon how either type of communication opens
or closes space for others' perspectives. Discussions about deliberative
democracy have focused on the kinds of power that can and should be

TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

305

afforded in public acts. 76 We know that to speak is to wield a power in which
others can be easily silenced. Yet listening as a deliberative capacity deserves
more attention too, since Western communication research and practice
has tended to emphasize speaking over listening.77 Deliberative discourse
recognizes status shifts, always leaving open even the smallest of spaces for
others. Such a "cognitive dedication to the word of the other demands ... a
kind of inner abnegation. Without this inner renunciation the individual
can only hold a dialogue with himself' -similar to what Martin Buber called
an I-thou rather than I-it orientation to others. 78 Power, in this regard, can
be viewed as tied to choices to make communication public or private. For
example, a group of environmental advocates could keep their interests
( such as who their funders are) public rather than private during a debate to
construct a more open, accessible, and accountable' communicative space
for others.
A conversation between Ed Schultz and John Nichols in the media
transcripts highlighted a similar need, covering presidential candidate Mitt
Romney's conference call to business leaders around the nation during the
election, which urged executives to "make it very dear to your employees
what you believe is in the best interest of your enterprise."79 In addition to a
lack of public transparency about the organizations and interests funding
such actions, Schultz and Nichols discussed the possibility that Romney's
comments and the subsequent pro-Romney rallies set up by many corpo
rate leaders around the United States were overly coercive, undermining the
deliberative capacities of citizens to speak freely in their workplaces, or at
least to not feel pressured by their employers to vote for a particular
candidate.80
From the general definition, a quality of deliberative communication
further involves becoming comfortable with multiple identities-or the idea
that one's civic identity should be a fluid construction. Much work on
identity finds that human selves are "shape[d] through an ongoing pro
cess ... forming a sense ofself and then expanding or correcting that sense as
we meet other selves. There is no such thing as a neatly defined, once-and
for-all identity." 81 In this light, the identities wagered in public affairs
Republican, Democrat, health care advocate, lobbyist-can be viewed as
commitments (akin to the "broadly informed judgments" part of the gen
eral definition) subject to expansion or contraction based upon the infor
mation and experience one has taken in to that point in his or her life,
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subject to further interventions (akin to the "unending openness"
highlighted).
Given some popular understandings of identity, the connection between
selves and more robust forms of deliberative communication could be easily
misunderstood, so Neil Postman's explanation of "role-fixation" problems
may prove helpful:
We all know people who cannot transit from one semantic environment to
another. Professors, for instance, are apt to remain Professors even in situa
tions where none are required. And t11ere are Political People who see
Significance in someone's ordering scrambled eggs. And there are Comics
who are always "on." And Moralists for whom there is no joy anywhere, only
responsibility. And Cynics who will never let themselves be awed, or let
anything be revered. Such people may be said to be self- or role-fixated, and,
what is worse, they are apt to assert their fixation as a virtue. These people
think of themselves as having strong character, but really it's impoverished,
single-dimensional, lacking the courage to try out new selves and thus
grow. 82

From the standpoint of public discourse, this theory of identity takes
seriously one's commitments, but also focuses on how reified selves can
overly "close" space for further communication to amend and advance
upon one's prior political choices. It is equally not a call to the other extreme
of purely fluid, perhaps postmodern identities. Public affairs demand that
we bring our selves and judgments to public processes-for example, dur
ing an election, whether one chooses to be a Democrat, Republican, Inde
pendent, or to make more implicit choices such as "apathetic voter" or
"nonparticipant," identity choices will be made regardless.
An additional virtue of a deliberative orientation is that it should make
finding common ground in political matters more likely. If an individual
cultivates a solidified identity of 'Tm a Republican" or 'Tm a Democrat" in
her or his approach to public life, a univocal, unwavering politics in which
space remains closed for others seems highly probable. If this individual
became more comfortable with multiple political identities, however, such as
seeing themselves not only as a "Republican," but a "sometimes Libertarian,"
"parent with schoolchildren," "consumer at a particular supermarket
chain," and "member of a particular locale," one may start with a higher
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likelihood of having common ground with others over a variety of political
issues (empirical research also supports the idea that finding initial com
mon ground is vital for social engagement).83 The media transcripts evi
denced one such deliberative moment in Nancy Pelosi's (D-CA) argument
against drastic federal tax cuts, which expanded her identity beyond "poli
tician": "Do you have children that breathe air? Do you have grandchildren
that drink water? I'm a mom and I have five kids.... As a mom, I was
vigilant about food safety, right moms? If you could depend on the govern
ment for one thing, it was that you had to be able to trust the water that our
kids drank and the food that they ate." 84 Becoming comfortable with
multiple political identities does not guarantee that citizens will find com
mon ground with one another, but it does highlight how public discourse
that begins from broad political self-images could serve to open spaces for
public communication before they are too quickly and unnecessarily
narrowed.
With an understanding of identity choices as opened or closed in acts of
communication, this specific quality of deliberative communication attends
to constructing civic identities that are broadly informed but not necessarily
bound by arguments tied to the past, present, or future. McKerrow similarly
argues that the ability to see beyond the present moment is critical to
democratic communication: "It is a state, not of being in but of acting out of
the world, not toward any one predetermined place, but to act toward the
future in a manner that preserves the ability to move beyond the lines that
define one's place at any moment in time."85 Always leaving some space
open for further communication to inform the self presents opportunities
to see differences with others as points for constant learning and empathetic
role-playing. It is the type of "partial cosmopolitanism" called for by Kwame
Anthony Appiah, which aims both to take one's background and traditions
seriously while becoming comfortable with an identity as a "citizen of the
cosmos."86
These three qualities are intended to be heuristic, deepening a primary
question for deliberative rather than exclusively civil communication: is
space opened or narrowed for others in act(s) of communication? To focus
on the contribution these qualities might make to civil public discourse
when evaluating a policy problem, let us return to the previous example of
the gun control advocate who argues that the federal government should
create a law banning assault weapons. With a respect for human limitations,
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this individual may realize how human beings' egos can easily get wrapped
up with an issue, and how extremely insular the groups within which one
might be situated have become, so that his or her justified anger should also
come with some interpretive humility. This person has important contri
butions to make to public discourse, but she or he keeps one foot in the past
and one in the possibility that present or future arguments could lead down
other paths. Although angry, this person attempts to keep his or her inter
ests public and transparent-they had a relative die in a shooting, for
instance, or they come from a liberal family in which taking this position
was easier than not-but still remain open to further investigation. At the
same time, perhaps this person is currently in a position of power as an
attorney, meaning that others' important voices or data from different fields
are yet to be considered. Given what this individual views as a massive
volume of evidence supporting gun control, he or she assumes the identity
"gun control advocate" (or related forms of identity), but holds this com
mitment as tentative to forgo making this civic self a fundamental stopping
point for further communication.
BENEFITS

Returning to the four aspects of civility rhetoric highlighted in the media
analysis, adding "deliberative" to "civil" public discourse brings several
benefits more clearly into view. First, deliberative communication provides
conceptual clarity for public discourse about civility. The manifold terms
that are often brought to discussions of civility can be tested under a wider
criterion covering the extent to which individuals make broadly informed
judgments with an unending openness to others' communication. The
focus on "broadly informed" and "unending openness" highlight that com
municators should approach the larger public environment as openly as
possible, but also that such well-informed and open orientations can rea
sonably lead to relatively closed, passionate conclusions about public policy
problems.
The processes by which individuals and groups make such judgments
configure civil with deliberative communication-a social movement's in
civility could be productive in making a well-informed judgment about
unjust economic laws, so long as some room is always left for more argu-
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mentation to influence present or future choices. As such, this theory
accounts for terms of compromise and partisanship in a way that some
forms of civility rhetoric may not. Under these terms, being deliberative
functions as a generally applicable orientation for public policy problem
solving, but also remains sensitive to the demands of particular contexts for
which vigorous advocacy or other forms of communication may be appro
priate.87 An environmental coalition holding a company accountable for
dumping toxic waste near a local community should be expected to use
forceful protests in pursuit of its cause; thus, the "uncivil tongue" that
scholars like Lozano-Reich and Cloud call for could certainly be war
ranted. 88 Yet maintaining some openness to the possibility that the move
ment could always be better informed about the situation still remains
important. For example, perhaps the environmental coalition has been
proceeding under the assumption that the whole company is at fault when
the responsibility really lies with a particular manager and his team. In this
light, Foss and Griffin's proposal for "invitational rhetoric" remains appli
cable, and could keep the movement from becoming too hermetic in its
public advocacy.
Similarly, if civil rights leaders stage a sit-in to advocate for a new federal
employment policy, or a health care reform group engages in a protest to
reverse a state decision-both political contexts where problem-solving
discourse among interlocutors appears hardly fitting-then such strategic,
forceful modes of rhetoric might be expected. Protests may even be needed
to garner public attention and get a problem recognized in the first place.
But a deliberative orientation could still stand to inform such advocacy in
the long-term by having the leaders and group remain open to the possibil
ity that different perspectives and positions could provide alternate strate
gies or future outcomes. The "strange bedfellows" phenomenon, 89 where
political alliances and policy changes have been advanced by advocates who
typically hold disparate positions, attests to the kind of value a broadly
informed and continually open orientation could have in a range of political
contexts.
Second, civility and reason may become unnecessarily dissociated, so to
some degree, "deliberative" attempts to transcend such divisions-by ac
counting for how one's civility or incivility, reasons or lack of reasons-may
open or close space for communication in public policy contexts. A broader
range and repertoire of communicative acts are afforded for public rhetoric-

310

RHETORIC & ?usuc AJ:FAIRS

meeting Darrin Hicks's challenge "to discover models of deliberative en
gagement that do not require that citizens discount their passions, cultural
knowledge, and deeply held convictions"90-moving beyond the kind of
minimizing civility appeals highlighted in the media analysis, which tended
to construct stopping points for further communication.
Third, deliberative discourse works to circumvent potentially unproduc
tive discussions about authenticity (or whether communicators are being
fake/real). As bandied back and forth in media discourse, civility can be
about another person or group's motives, with incessant speculations about
intent, self-presentation, and other factors. In addition to manner and tone,
"deliberative" focuses on important elements external to individuals as
well-what "broadly" outside of a person is being brought to bear on public
judgments, such as facts, sources, precedents, and so on-in other words,
space for what others have provided the public discourse on a topic of
concern. Most "data" are simply others' findings, and anyone unaccount
able to data beyond their own may tend toward an individual or group
solipsism that portends poorly for public affairs. Commentary need not
focus so much on a political candidate's smile as authentically civil or not;
rather, the candidate's viability can be assessed in terms of an overall
orientation to make broad and continually open judgments accountable to
further discourse, of which a smile could be considered simply one part.
Last, deliberative communication should not be reduced exclusively to
someone's tone or manners. With a focus on opening or closing communi
cative space, we might identify how civility can be used to shut down speech
or create stopping points for communication. In essence, part ofmy point in
this analysis has been to demonstrate that civility should largelyfollowfrom
deliberative discourse-the two are valuable partners in constructing robust
public engagement. To remain unendingly open to others in communica
tive acts presumes some degree of public rather than wholly private space, in
which verbal or nonverbal gestures of reflection and respect are likely
needed to create a shared space. At the same time, individuals should take
seriously how such gestures could also become rhetorical weapons that
forgo more broadly informed judgments. In either case, while upholding
the best that standards of civil communication may offer, a deliberative
criterion accounts for and addresses some of the rhetorical maneuvers
enacted when civil appeals appear to be most limited.
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CONCLUSION

Civility is a vital concept for public discourse. It is surely better that people
on freeways, in supermarkets, or ir. public forums largely remain civil rather
than uncivil. But I find that a "deliberative" approach can account for and
address some of the limitations civility rhetoric currently faces, construct
ing a more robust civil discourse than might otherwise be afforded. Some
may consider this project a recovery of some historical senses of civility,
such as Aristotle's calls for civic friendship.91 I would not quibble with such
assessments, but do find that civility rhetoric-as covered in scholarly
debates and practiced in contemporary media messages-can sometimes
obscure more than enlighten when it comes to stronger understandings of
and practices for public communication, a problem that a deliberative
orientation brings more sharply into focus.
In one sense, deliberative discourse highlights how concerns for the
differences between education and propaganda may be more important
considerations than civility alone. Alex Carey says propaganda is "commu
nications where the form and content is selected with the single-minded
purpose of bringing some target audience to adopt attitudes and beliefs
chosen in advance by the sponsors of the communications," whereas edu
cation "encourage[s] critical enquiry ... to open minds to arguments for
and against any particular conclusion, rather than close them to the possi
bility of any conclusion but one."92 The propaganda/education dichotomy
may prove helpful for thinking about deliberative communication, but it is
also a bit stark since this essay's definition of "deliberative" finds room for
single-minded purposes that can still remain open. Deliberative communi
cation instead parallels more directly Wayne Booth's statement: "Whatever
imposes belief without personal engagement becomes inferior to whatever
makes mutual exploration more likely.... The process of inquiry through
discourse thus becomes more important than any possible conclusions, and
whatever stultifies such fulfillment becomes demonstrably wrong."93
In this light, some typical ways of talking about politics may need
revision. Once the election results were in, longtime political advisor Bob
Shrum commented: "So what we are going to see tomorrow is more civility
than you sometimes see after these elections" between the candidates.94
From a deliberative standpoint, such comments invite us to consider more
than just the manner with which interlocutors engaged one another, instead
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asking whether efforts at open, informed persuasion took place both before
and after the election. Similarly, there is a popular tale often told about
former Republican President Reagan and Democratic Speaker of the House
Tip O'Neill grabbing beers and being civil toward one another after work, a
model of political friendship that commentators like Tom Keene and Bob
Woodward invoked in the media transcripts,95 and that this essay would
generally support. My analysis suggests that if Reagan and O'Neill were only
being civil to the exclusion of deliberation, however, such recollections
might be viewed in a different light. While recognizing the term "delibera
tive" is not much used in current affairs, it can inform times and places when
civility is being raised in a relatively unexamined fashion.
At the same time, we should not underestimate how engaging in delib
erative discourse can also go awry. Cass Sunstein's findings on the human
tendency to engage in "enclave deliberation," 96 essentially becoming more
extreme when having discussions in homogenous groups, present a clear
challenge to such an ideal. Moreover, Stanley Deetz's work on potential
deliberative illusions-whereby management can, for instance, have a
meeting where everyone is allowed to have their voice heard but nothing
ever really changes97-presents an additional obstacle to enacting strong
forms of public reasoning and reasonability.
Yet both examples further focus the need to make broadly informed
judgments that remain continually open to others' communication. Sun
stein's findings rest upon groups' homogeneity, demonstrating how easily
extremist problems can stem from antideliberative, "narrowly" informed,
overly closed communicative spaces. In Deetz's example, the fault lies less
with deliberative discourse than the need to remain vigilant about the
different ways that communication can become less than "open" and ac
countable. As Postman said: "The distinction between language that says
'Believe this' and language that says 'Consider this' is, in my opinion,
certainly worth making, and especially because the variety of ways of saying
'Believe this' are so various and sophisticated." 98 In other words, a deliber
ative approach should still attend to the complex, manifest ways that stop
ping points can be created through rhetorical acts-whether civil,
deliberative, or other terms are being engaged. As Asen underscores, even
calls for "counterpublicity" should be assessed in terms of how varying
advocates can "restrict or expand discursive space for others."99
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In a Wall Street Journal article after the election titled "Persuasion as the
Cure for Incivility," University of Notre Dame President John Jenkins
argued that better understandings of persuasion can sharpen civility's con
tours. He stated that "we need to try harder to persuade one another-to try
to get people to change their minds," since "much of the election campaign
ing and much of the budget discussion wasn't designed to change anyone's
mind, but instead to encourage people to believe more deeply what they
already believed." 100 Even attempts to have people acknowledge an excep
tion or that a policy may not be so horrendous would be useful. In his words,
"if we earnestly try to persuade, civility takes care of itself. " 101 This closely
related argument follows a similar path to the one pursued in this essay,
although I find the concept of "deliberative" communication more useful
than "persuasion" in asking us to balance efforts at changing one another's
minds with a willingness to be changed. Ultimately, my hope has been to
point in one direction that might bring more clarity to our understandings
of this subject, while energizing and improving what is possible in public
discourse.
NOTES

1. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation ofDreams, trans. A. A. Brill (New York:
Macmillan, 1913), 165.
2. Robert L. Ivie, "Toward a Humanizing Style of Democratic Dissent," Rhetoric &
Public Affairs 11 (2008); 454.
3. Stephen L. Carter, Civility; Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette ofDemocracy (New
York: Basic Books, !998), 11.
4. Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smifa, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 55 (1969): 8.
5. Raymie McKerrow, "Coloring Outside the Llnes: The Limits of Civility," Vital
Speeches of the Day, February 15, 200i, 280.
6. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2002), 35, 38.
7. Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization; A Cultural History of Gender and Race in
the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 121.
8. Gloria A. Anzaldua, Borderlands Ia Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco, CA:
Aunt Lute Books, 1999); bell hooks, Talking Back; Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black
(Boston, MA: South End Press, i.989).

314

RH ETORiC & Pue u C AFFAIRS

9. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and
Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
10. Nina M. Lozano-Reich and Dana L. Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational
Rhetoric and the Problem oflnequality," Western Journal of Communication 73
(2009): 220.
11. Sonja K. Foss anc: Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an
Invitational Rhetoric," Communication Monographs 62 (�995): 2-18; Jennifer E.
Bone, Cindy L. Griffin, and T. M. Linda Scholz, "Beyond Traditional
Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and a Move toward Civility,*
Western Journal of Communication 72 (2008): 434-62.
12. Lozano-Reich and Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue," 220.
13. Lozano-Reich and Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue," 221-23.
14. Lozano-Reich and Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue, 223.
15. A. Christie Hurrell, "Civility in Online Discussion: The Case of the Foreign Policy
Dialogue," Canadian Journal of Communication 30 (2005): 633.
16. Christopher R. Darr, "Civility and Social Responsibility: 'Civil Rationality' in the
Confirmation HeaI".ngs of Justices Roberts and Alito," Argumentation. and Advocacy
44 (2007): 57.
17. See for example: Robert L. Ivie, "Rhetorical Deliberation and Democratic Politics in
the Here and Now," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5 (2002): 277-85.
18. Thomas W. Benson, "The Rhetoric of Civility: Power, Authenticity, and Democracy,"
Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 1 (2011): 22.
19. Using "civility" also highlighted all uses of "incivility," although there were actually
few uses of the latter term across the transcripts. I chose not to use related terms such
as "civil" or "uncivir given the need for scope and because "civility" appeared to have
a narrower focus. "Civil," for example, is involved in more separate constructions
such as "civil service."
20. Sarah Sobieraj and Jeffrey M. Berry, "From Incivility to Outrage: Political Discourse
in Biogs, Talk Radio, anc. Cable News," Political Communication 28 (2011): 21.
21. Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics ofMeaning
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003).
22. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy ofLiterary Form, 3rc. ed. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973), 20, 69.
23. See for exampie: "Cavuto for December 10, 2022," Cavuto, December 10, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.comlhottopics/lnacademic!?verb=sf&s.fi=
ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 13, 2013), par. 139; "For October 17, 2012,"
Hardball, October 17, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademid

TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

315

?verb=c=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 13, 2013), par. 157; "The Ed
Show for October 18, 2012," The Ed Show, October 18, 2012, http://
w111w.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi = ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 13, 2013), par. 99.
24. "Romney, Obama to Trade One-Liners," Piers Morgan Tonight, October 18, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics//nacademicl?verb=sf&sft = A COONBGenSrch
(accessed September 14, 2013), par. 18; "Out of Bounds; Fans Cheer after Quarterback
Injured," Good Morning America, October 9, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
hottopics/lnacademicl?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013),
par. 30; "George H. W. Bush Treated; Obama and Romney Face to Face; Trolleys
Collide in Boston; Actor Blasts 'Two and a Half Men'; Winning Tickets Sold in
Arizona & Missouri," CNN Newsroom, November 29, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic!?verb=sf&sfi= ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. 72; "Facing Fiscal Cliff, One on One with America's
Pastort Piers Morgan Tonight, November 27, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
hottopicsllnacademic/?verb=sf&sft=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013),
par. 255.
25. "Planes, Seats Fly for American Airlines," CBS This Morning, October 2, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sft=ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), par.137; "For October 19, 2012," Hardball, October
19, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis. comlhottopics/lnacademic/?verb= sf&s.fi_=
ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 51.
26. "Teen Gunned Down by Man Who Felt Threatened," Jane Velez-Mitchell, Nover.iber 28,
2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademid?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), pars. 40-47; "Police Attacked in Drunken Brawl; Drew
Peterson Trial Begins; Suspected Killer Still on the RWl; Sacistic Attack on Tape?" Jane
Velez-Mitchell, July 31, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopicsllnacademid
?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), pars. 24-34; "Minorities
Car.ie Out in Droves for Obama; What Can President Obama Accomplish?; Pentagon:
Iran Fires on U.S. Drone; Obama Campaign's Secret Strategy," The Situation Room,
November 8, 2012, http:llwww.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademid?verb=sf&s.fi"'
ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 14, 2013), par. 309.
27. Specifically, the author conducted a Lexis-Nexis search of major world
publications, narrowed the search to newspapers, and looked only at U.S.-based
papers between July 1 and December 31, 2012. The term "civility" was !lsed 37 9
times across 285 separate documents (some 725 pages). While Fox News used the
term the most in the broacicast transcripts, the New York Times had the highest

316

RHETORIC & Pusuc AFFAIRS
number of documents with the word in the newspaper data (74 documents),
whereas the Washington Post had 78, the Los Angeles Times 31, the Tampa Bay
Times 20, and so forth. Using the software program Concordance, quantitative
lists were created for each of the four words both before and after the term
"civility" across all of the newspaper sources. Of terms with more than two
references, words like "community" (:2 counts in the l left category), "fairness"
(5 counts in the 2 left category), "compassion" (14 counts in the 2 right category),
"compromise" anc "cecent" (3 counts each in the 2 right category) appeared. In
many cases, these high word counts were simply repetitious terms covering the
same event across multiple sources, such as the word "community," which was
brought up numerous times in the newspapers to refer to the same "seminar
exploring community." Thus, there were very few word clusterings across the
transcripts, showing that-in addition to the broadcast transcripts-much
conceptual diversity around "civility" appeared across the newspapers.

28. "NBC Nightly News for August 14, 2012," NBC Nightly News, August 14, 2012,
http:l/www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sj&sji=ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2012), par. 57.
29. "PBS Newshour for August 21, 2012," PBS Newshour, August 21, 2012, http://www.
/exisnexis. comlhottopicsllnacademicl?verb= sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2012), par. 319.
30. See for example: "Interview with Noelle Nikpour, David Avella," Fox Hannity,
November 8, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics//nacademic/?verb=sj&sfi=
ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 5.
31. "For October 13, 2012," Melissa Harris-Perry, October 13, 2012, http://www.
/exisnexis. com!hottopics//nacademicl?verb = sj&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. 57.
32. "Hurricane Sancy Relief Efforts Continue; New Presidential Polls; Tale of Two Cities;
CNN Poll: Very Tight Race in Colorado; Campaigns Begin Final Rush; Live Now:
Governor Christie Briefing on New Jersey Recovery; Roller Coaster Dropped into the
Ocean; Obama Returns to Campaign Mode; Romney Stops Pulling His Punches," The
Situation Room, November 1, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopicsllnacademid
?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 173.
33. "A Linguist's Serious Take On 'The A-Word,'" Fresh Air, August 29, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb = sj&sfi =ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), par. 7.
34. "For October 13t par. 81.

TOWARD ROBUST PUB�iC ENGAGEMENT

317

35. For more on "dissociation," see Don Waisanen, "Political Conversion as
Intrapersonal Argument: Self-Dissociation in David Brock's Blinded by the Right,"
Argumentation and Advocacy 47 (2011): 228-45.
36. "The Last Word for August 14, 2012," The Last Word with Lawrence O'Donnell,
August 14, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com!hottopics/lnacademic!?verb=sf&sfi =
ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 20B), par. 187.
37. "Tropical Storm Isaac Threatens Haiti; Mysterious Disease Baffles Doctors," CNN
Newsroom, August 23, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademid
?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 115.
38. "Tropical Storm," par. 122.

39. Helene Cooper and Jeff Zeleny, "Obama Calls for a New Era of Civility in U.S.
Politics," New York Times, January 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/
13obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O (accessed September 1, 2013).
40. See for example: Mark Jurkowitz, Paul Hitlin, Amy Mitchell, Laura Santhanam, Steve
Adams, Monica Anderson, and Nancy Vogt, "The Changing News TV Landscape,"
The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2013,
http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/special-reports-landing-page/the-changing-tv-news
landscapel (accessed September 11, 2013).
41. "Analysis with Marjorie Clifton, Penny Nance," Fox Hannity, November 27, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics//nacademic!?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), pars. 10, 12.
42. "Hannity for October 11, 2012," Fox Hannity, October 11, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic!?verb=sf&sfi =ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. 126.
43. "Interview with Michelle Malkin," FoxHannity, December 27, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi = ACOONBGenSrch (accessed

September 16, 2013), par. 32.
44. "Interview with Michelle Malkin," Fox Hannity, December 12, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb= sf&sfi =ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. 28.
45. "For December 18, 2012," Hardball, December 18, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com!
hottopics/lnacademic!?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013),
par. 281.
46. "Rachel Maddow Show for October :l8, 20:2," The Rachel Maddow Show, October 18,
2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com!hottopicsllnacademid?verb=ef&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), par. 218.

318

RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

47. "For August 10, 2012, CBS,» CBS This Morning, August 10, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi = ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. :8.
48. "Hannity for September 7, 2012," Fox Hannity, September 7, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb= sf&sfi = ACOONBGenSrch (accessed

September 16,2013),par.111.
49. "Interview with Newt G�grich," Fox Hannity, December 13, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopics/Inacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), par. 13.
50. "Stossel Matters/ The O'Reilly Factor, October 2, 2012, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/hottopicsllnacademic!?verb= sf&sfi = ACOONBGenSrch (accessed
September 16, 2013), pars. 43-8.
51. "Interview with Newt Gingrich," pars. 15-24.
52. "Chick-fil-A Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage; Syrian Government Neadng Collapse?"
CNN Newsroom, July 19, 2012, http:l/www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/
?verb=sf&sfi = A COONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 65.
53. A major study of biogs, talk radio, and cable news found that direct confrontation
between people of differing viewpoints is absent in most of these types of media
programs,which does not serve civility well either. As the authors underscored: "This
relative lack of jousting is explained by the noteworthy absence of opposing voices
within individual programs. Hosts share airtime with ideologically compatible voices,
end periodically with moderate or 'neutral' visitors, but very rarely with true believers
from the other side." Sobieraj and Berry, "From Incivility," 30.
54. Carter, Civility, 89.
55. Ronald C. Arnett, "Dialogic Civility as Pragmatic Ethical Praxis: An Interpersonal
Metaphor for the Public Domain," Communication Theory 11 (2001 ): 315.
56. W. Barnett Pearce and Kim A. Pearce, "Combining Passions and Abilities: Toward
Dialogic Virtuosity," Southern Journal of Communication 65 (2000): 162.
57. "What Are Dialogue and Deliberation?," The National Coalitionfor Dialogue &
Deliberation, http://ncdd.org/rclwhat-are-dd (accessec. August 29, 2013).
58. ''What are," pars. 5-6.
59. "What are," pars. 8.
60. Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 377;
see also Jurgen Habermas, "Political Communication in Media Society: Does
Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on
Empirical Research," Communication Theory 16 (2006): 411-26.

TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

319

61. G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A
Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation," Journal of the American
Forensic Association 18 (1982): 224-25; G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Engager.1ents of
Communication: Jurgen Habermas on Discourse, Critical Reason, and Controversy,"
in Perspectives on Philosophy ofCommunication, ed. Pat Arneson (West Lafayette, IN:
Purdue University Press, 2007), 112-42; David S. Birdsell, "George W. Bush's Signing
Statements: The Assault on Deliberation," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10 (2007):
335-60; John Gastil, Political Communication and Deliberation (Los Angeles, CA:
Sage Publications, 2008); Michael William Pfau, "Conventions of Deliberation?
Convention Addresses and Deliberative Containment in the Second Party System,"
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9 (2006): 635-54.
62. Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Deliberative Democracy:
Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997), 74; Walter R. Fisher, "Glimpses of Hope: Rhetorical and Dialogical
Discourse Promoting Cosmopolitanism," in Communication Ethics: Between
Cosmopolitanism and Provinciality, ed. Kathleen Glenister Roberts and Ronald C.
Arnett (New York: Peter T.ang, 2008), 50; Stephen W. Littlejohn and W. Barnett
Pearce, Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 1997), 157.
63. James Bohman, Public Deliberation; Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 17.
64. Jay P. Childers," Deliberating Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal ofSpeech 94 (2008): 466;
see also Erik W. Doxtader, "The Entwinement of Argument and Rhetoric: A
Dialectical Reading of Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action," in Readings on
Argumentation, ed. Angela J. Aguayo and Timothy R. Steffensmeier (State College,
PA: Strata Publishing, 2008), 297-309.
65. Simone Chambers, "Deliberative Democratic Theory," Annual Review ofPolitical
Science 6 (2003): 309.
66. Maeve Cooke, "Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy," Political Studies 48
(2000): 948.
67. Robert Asen, "Toward a Normative Conception of Difference in Public Deliberation,"
Argumentation and Advocacy 35 (!999): 123.
68. Robert Asen, "Ideology, Materiality, and Counterpublidty: William E. Simon and the
Rise of a Conservative Counterintelligentsia," Quarterly Journal ofSpeech 95 (2009):
263.
69. Thomas B. Farrell, Norms ofRhetorical Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995), 1.

320

R�ETORIC & Pusuc AFFAIRS

70. To use an interpersonal example, this analysis is not suggesting that those in
long-term, committed relationships should be "open" to leaving their partner.
71. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New
York; Oxford University Press, 2007), 37, 52-5, 60.
72. See also Don J. Waisanen, "Hermeneutic Range in Church-State Deliberation: Cross
Meanings in the Los Angeles County Seal Controversy," Western Journal of
Communication 77 (2013): 361-81.
73. See Waisanen, "Hermeneutic." This is not a call to embrace postmodern modes of
interpretation. Religion writer Brian McLaren argues, for example, that attention to
human interpretation is an ethical .matter; in his Christian tradition, even Jesus and
Paul took selections out of the Old Testament in support of their arguments to the
exclusion of many other words and passages that might have been chosen. Brian D.
McLaren, Why Did Jesus, Moses, the Buddha and Mohammed Cross the Road?
Christian Identity in a Multi-Faith World (New York; Jericho Books, 2012).
74. "For August 2, 2012," MSNBC Special, August 2, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sf&sft=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013),
par. 13.
75. See Charles Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper, �Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization; The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,"
Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 37 (1979); 2098-109; Carl I. Hovland and
Muzafer Sherif, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication
and Attitude Change (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).
76. See Chantal Mouffe, "Deliberative Der.1ocracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" Social
Research 66 (1999): 745-58.
77. Lisbeth Lipari, "Rhetoric's Other; Lev'J1as, Listening, and the Ethical Response,"
Philosophy and Rhetoric 45 (2012); 227-45.
78. Gemma Corradi Fiumara, The Other Side ofLanguage: A Philosophy ofListening,
trans. Charles Lambert (New York; Routledge, 1990), 125; Martin Buber, I and Thou,
2nd ed., trans. Ronald G. Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).
79. "The Ed Show," par. 103.
80. "The Ed Show," pars. 180-90.
81. Paul F. Knitter, Without Buddha, I Could Not Be a Christian (Oxford, UK: Oneworlc!,
2009), 214-15 (my italics); see also Dana Anderson, Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical
Selves in Conversion (Columbia; University of South Carolina Press, 2007); Randall A.
Lake, "Argumentation and the Self; The Enactment of Identity in Dances with
Wolves," Argumentation and Advocacy 34 (1997); 66-89.

TOWARD ROBUST PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

321

82. Neil Postman, Crazy Talk, Stupid Talk: Ho·,v We Defeat Ourselves by the Way We Talk
and What To Do About It (New York: Delacorte Press, 1976), 117-18: see also Don
Waisanen, "An Alternative Sense of Humor: The Problems with Crossing Comedy
and Politics in Public Discourse," in Venomous Speech and Other Problems in
American Political Discourse, vol. 2, ed. Clarke Rountree (New York: Praegar, 2013),
299-315.
83. Hovland and Sherif, Social Judgment.
84. "Interview with John Sununu," Fox Hannity, August 7, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.caml
hottopics!lnaaulemic/?verb=sf&sfi""'ACOONBGenSrch (acces.5ed September !6, 2013), par. 9).
85. McKerrow, "Coloring," 281.
86. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2007), xiv.
87. Some debate in the deliberative democracy literature has covered the extent to which
communication norms might be considered universal or particular to contexts; see
for example: Seyla Benhabib, "The Democratic Moment and the Problem of
Difference," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries ofthe Political,
ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Prfoceton University Press, 1996), 3-18. My
general definition and some of the specific planks for "deliberative" are positioned as
conventions reflexively concerned for both unities and differences. The general
definition of deliberative is intended to be a relatively applicable and productive
orientation in public policy contexts (addressing calls for common :1orms and
intersubjective values), but-in the spirit of the very definition itself-leaves open
space for other emerging orientations, forms of appeal, styles, and the like to suitably
address the demands of political situations by respecting concerns for difference and
diversities.
88. Lozano-Reich and Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue."
89. See for example: Ingrid Tar:::tm, "Dangerous Appetites: Human Rights Activism and
Conflict Commodities," Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 687-704.
90. Darrin Hicks, "The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy," Rhetoric & Public Affairs
5 (2002): 254: see also Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 36-77.
91. See for example Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, "On Civic Friendship," Ethics 107 (1996):
97-128.
92. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out ofDemocracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1997), 20.
93. Wayne C. Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric ofAssent (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1974), 137.

322

RHETORIC & Pi,;BUC AFFAIRS

94. "The Ed Show for November 28, 2012/ The Ed Show, November 28, 2012,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb = sf&s,� = ACOONBGenSrch
(accessed September 16, 2013), par. 282.
95. ''Washington Post's Bob Woodward Discusses Obama on Bloomberg TV/ Bloomberg
Surveillance, September 13, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/
?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch (accessed September 16, 2013), par. 25.
96. Cass Sunstein, "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes," Yale Law
Journal 110 (2000): 113.
97. Stanley Deetz, Transforming Communication, Transforming Business: Building
Responsive and Responsible Workplaces (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1995).
98. Postman, Crazy Talk, 170-71.
99. Asen, "Ideologyt 282.
100. John I. Jenkins, "Persuasion as the Cure for Incivility," Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/artide!SBl 0001424127887323339704578173860563117812.html?mod=
googlenews_wsj (accessed September 2, 2013), pars. 2, 5.
101. Jenkins, "Persuasion," par. 11.

